Give me your opinion. What would be the possibility

of an uprising from within if we were to have some kind of

external attack with some internal clandestine operations? Is Saddam

Hussein’s control on the leadership of that country so tight

that it’s very difficult to have that uprising from within?

To all of you, please. Doctor, go ahead.

I want to come back to a follow up, but I would

like to get Mr. Butler’s opinion, as well.

May I follow up?

To the professor, the fact that we have, basically,

air cover over two-thirds of the country in the north and the

south, how do you utilize that to your advantage to provoke the

uprisings even before you go into the center core one-third that we

don’t have the air cover on right now? And can you utilize that in

a way to stir the rebellion before you have to move in on Baghdad?

Thank you very much. Professor.

Senator Feingold. Yes. Ambassador. Senator Lugar.

Give us your opinion about the complicity of

Syria in avoiding the U.N. sanctions. Who would like to start? Professor.

Any other comments?

The first downed pilot, through a series of mistakes,

we left down, Commander Scott Speicher. Since then, we

have credible evidence of a live sighting of Commander Speicher

being taken to a hospital. Do any of you have any information with

regard to the whereabouts or the condition of Commander Speicher?Mr. Ambassador.

And why do you come to that conclusion, that he might be alive?

Well, I take every opportunity to ask that question,

whether I’m meeting with the King of Jordan or the President

of Syria or the Prime Minister of Lebanon, meeting with various

government officials here, because there’s a family that’s going

through agony in Jacksonville, Florida, on not knowing what is the

status of their family member. So thank you for your comments.

Are there further questions? Senator Lugar.

Any further questions of the committee?

On instructions from the chairman, who will return

at 2 o’clock, we will have a short recess, and the committee

will resume with panel two at 2 o’clock.

Yes, but since then he has sent new instructions. And he will return at 2.

The committee stands in recess.

I would yield to the Senator from West Virginia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Well, I agree with what you have said about what after, and a

good example of that is Afghanistan, and we are not even into the

what after. We are still in the middle of it, and yet we are not

going to have success for the long run in Afghanistan unless we

have a major presence there to help them, and you have pointed

out the distinction between Afghanistan and Iraq being the potential

for weapons of mass destruction.

Now, if we got involved in Iraq militarily, what is that going to

do to logistical and personnel support in other parts of the world,

particularly in Central Asia? Is that going to stress us to the point

that we are not going to be able to supply what we need to over

there in Afghanistan, and in the surrounding area, and out there

in the Arabian Sea? Give us your comments on that.

Both of you were talking about the forces that

would have to be brought to bear from the outside. Do you have

a sense from your military experience as to how many troops we are talking about?

And not doing it on the cheap, and putting

large numbers on the ground, we are really talking about a 1/4 million

troops, are we not, having the backups you are talking about

if things go wrong. You have got to have that capability of backup.

Mr. Chairman, I think one of the things we

have to explore here is cost, and I am as much of a hawk as anybody,

but let us get it out on the table. With what we had in the

gulf war, roughly 1/2 million, the cost, the total cost was about, in

today’s dollars about $80 billion, so if you are going to have a force

half that size, and you are talking about the same duration, in today’s

dollars that is in the range of $40 billion.

Now, maybe we have to spend that, but let us understand that,

and let it be a part of the dialog.

Clearly, we have the new systems. By the way,

Joint Stars, Mr. Chairman, is built in my home town of Melbourne, Florida.

Mr. Chairman, I want to ask one more question, and this is a

very delicate question. You were not here before, when you had

given me the opportunity to chair the hearing, and I raised the

issue of the downed pilot from Jacksonville, Florida, from the gulf

war, and all of these folks were sitting in the audience and heard

my questions to the previous panel, and my question to you all

would be, if Commander Scott Speicher is alive, they are obviously

going to use him in some way as a shield, as some kind of wedge

to try to get us not to do certain things or go certain places.

That, of course, from a human standpoint, with a family that has

gone through what they have gone through in Jacksonville, if he

is alive, is just an awful contemplation. Can you all give to us, to

me any insight into how we would have to go about that? Do we

just have to be coldhearted and put the national interest first?

What would you recommend?

I could not expect you to answer any other way. Thank you.

The committee will resume. Chairman

Biden is just finishing up voting on the floor and will be here

momentarily and asked me to go on. And we apologize to our witnesses,

but when they call the votes—when the roll is called up

yonder, one has to respond.

I wanted to ask both of you about your opinion with regard to

the influence of radical fundamentalist groups operating in northern Iraq. Mr. Secretary?

Mr. Secretary, you had stated, I think, in your

actual remarks that you thought that there was a connection with

al-Qaeda. Would you elucidate and expand on that?

Do you think that Saddam Hussein would

share weapons of mass destruction with such groups?

I’m quite interested in exploring this question

of connection with al-Qaeda, because we haven’t seen a lot of commentary about that.

Mr. Berger. Is it your understanding that his threat of

chemical and biological warfare was one of the reasons that we did

not move on Baghdad 11 years ago in the gulf war? I would yield to the chairman.

We’ve asked the following question of other witnesses,

and I’d like to get your opinions. Do you think that weapons

inspections would satisfy the concerns that we have about Iraq’s weapons-of-mass-destruction programs?

Would weapons inspections——

Satisfy our concerns about their WMD program? Mr. Berger.

Well, I’ll ask you this final question. Then I’m going to turn it over to Senator Feingold.

Give us your opinion if the President should consult with Congress

before taking military action in Iraq. Senator Feingold.